In our paper, we would like to realize one of the optimal cloning attacks

that Eve may attempt during the communication phase, and verify the relation

between the information leakage and disturbance.

As can be seen in the security proofs of QKD protocols, security is based on

the fact that Eve’s information obtained during quantum communication is

bounded by the error probability in the legitimate users.

The information leakage into Eve will thus finally disappear by the privacy

amplification between Alice and Bob.

Therefore, our proposal will not challenge the security of the QKD

protocols, but support it.

We also hope we will learn more about quantum mechanics by exploring

experimental verification of the security on the QKD protocols.

The post here profoundly mistakes our work and claims something which is indeed never said in our manuscript. In fact, Quantum Key Distribution is secure (against, of course, reasonable models of eavesdropping attacks–an allmighty eavesdropper could always intercept the key, this is the reason why, for example, the situation is excluded where the eavesdropper is allowed to directly read the monitor of the computer on which the secure data appear). The security proofs we have now are rigorous mathematical theorems. Therefore, QKD is secure (as long as Quantum Mechanics is the “true” description of reality).

What we did in the cited manuscript is to propose a new experimental realization of one amongst many possible attacks which could succeed only against QKD systems presenting some flaws. Our attack is also called “cloning attack”, and is well-known in the literature since years. We simply proposed a different way to implement it, which can be easier and more efficient than some others.

Concluding, I want to stress here that we never claimed in any part of the manuscript that Quantum Cryptography is more insecure now than before. Sorry to delude with my answer the dreams of many frustrated quantum hackers wannabe, but I felt like a clarification was in order.

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